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conclusion of my visit to the dentist occurs earlier than the judgement itself. So, if there is no such fact as the fact that my visit to the dentist is past, what am I thanking goodness for when I say 'Thank goodness that's over!'?
Clearly, no tenseless fact will do. As Prior rightly points out, I am not thanking goodness for the fact that the conclusion of my visit to the dentist occurs at noon.
For one thing, it is a fact at all times that events have the dates that they do, so if this is the fact that I am thanking goodness for, there seems to be no explanation of why it is only appropriate to thank goodness for it after the event in question and not before. I might have known all morning that I would be out of the dentist's by noon, but I wouldn't thank goodness for it until after noon. Neither am I thanking goodness for the fact that the conclusion of my visit to the dentist occurs earlier than my utterance of 'Thank goodness that's over!' As Prior so aptly put it, why would anyone thank goodness for that?
Thus, there are two problems for the new B-theory of time embedded within Prior's challenge. Firstly, it must identify the fact for which we thank goodness when we say 'Thank goodness that's over!', but it seems that no tenseless fact will do. Secondly, it must provide an explanation of why it is only appropriate to utter this expression of relief just after, and not before or during, the painful experience.
A response to the first problem has emerged from a debate on this issue, whose main protagonists are MacBeath (1983) , Garrett (1988) , Oaklander (1992) and Mellor 4! (1998) . The second problem, however, has received no attention from B-theorists beyond the claim that, even if the B-theory is unable to answer it, the A-theory is equally unable to do so (Garrett 1988, pp. 204-05 and Mellor 1998, p.42) . Even if this is true, it is hardly satisfactory. Next, we will outline the prevailing response to the first problem. Then, we will present our response to the second problem.
III. The prevailing response to problem one
The question of what it is we thank goodness for when we say 'Thank goodness that's over!' has a wider and more general application than has been suggested by the discussion so far. We seem to have a wide variety of emotional responses to the tenses of events and states of affairs. For example, we can be excited, anxious, fearful, or hopeful about future events, and we can be embarrassed, relieved, distraught or nostalgic about past events. For convenience we will call such emotional states or responses 'tensed emotions'. A tensed emotion is an emotion directed at a past, present or future event or state of affairs. This definition is to be taken as neutral between an A-theory and a B-theory explanation of tensed emotions. Furthermore, it is pertinent to note that the same event may elicit different tensed emotions from us, depending on whether it is a past, present or future event. Take my visit to the dentist. I feel fear or dread when the event is (Garrett 1988, pp. 203-04 significant. According to Cockburn, unless the B-theory can provide a rational justification for our asymmetric emotional attitudes, it is forced to take the revisionary alternative. We think this is a false dilemma, since a causal explanation for our asymmetric emotional attitudes is available, which we develop and defend below. Furthermore, once the causal explanation is combined with the predominant response to problem one, outlined above, a satisfactory rationale for our emotional attitudes emerges.
The second horn of Cockburn's dilemma is particularly unattractive, since it would entail that there is only one emotional response appropriate to an unpleasant visit to the dentist. Furthermore, whatever that response is, it would be appropriate whether the visit was yet to occur, had already occurred, or was occurring right now. Another consequence would be that the grief felt over the death of a loved one
should not soften with time. If grief is appropriate, then it is as appropriate twenty years after the death as it is a week after the death. Indeed, it should be equally appropriate before the death.
Cockburn concludes that the B-theorist is committed to taking this revisionary line by arguing that the alternative is blocked, and so, unavailable to her. He argues that the B-theorist's ontological commitment to the reality of all times and their contents also commits her to the conclusion that they are all of equal significance (1997, p. 19) . But if all times and their contents are of equal significance, then there is no explanation for the way our emotional response to an event varies depending on whether that event is in the past, present or future, or on whether it is in the distant or proximate future or past. He supports this move by comparing the fact that a particular pain is very intense with the 'fact' that it is happening now. The first fact, he argues, confers a special status on the pain. It gives us a reason to be concerned about it, and a reason to act, presumably to avoid the source of the pain. But according to the B-theory, the fact that a particular pain is happening now is not really a fact about the pain at all, and so it cannot confer any special status on it. He writes:
To say that the pain is happening now is not to ascribe some further property to the pain; the role of the word 'now' is simply to indicate that 10! the pain is occurring at the same time as the utterance of the words. And that, presumably, cannot be regarded as conferring any special status on the pain considered in itself; any more than the fact that a man is suffering 'here' confers any special status on the suffering considered in itself. (1997, p. 19) We are not altogether sure what Cockburn means by 'special status', but presumably it is whatever warrants what we would take to be an 'ordinary' or 'appropriate' emotional response to an event. If a pain is intense then it has special status as it warrants a good deal of concern on the part of the person whose pain it is. But if being now is not a property that a pain (or anything else) can have, then it cannot warrant the same sort of concern or provide us with a reason to take evasive action. Furthermore, Cockburn's conclusion generalises to apply to past and future events. If being past is not a property that an event can have, then it cannot warrant grief or relief, or any other past-directed emotion. If being future is not a property that an event can have, then it cannot warrant anticipation, hope or fear. Cockburn's challenge to the B-theory is to explain how it is that we can have emotional responses to the tenses of events, when in reality events do not possess these tenses, but rather, all have the same ontological status. In the next section we tell an evolutionary story about why this is the case.
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V. Temporal Chauvinism
As has already been suggested, we think that the 'Thank goodness that's over' problem is just one example of a more widespread temporal chauvinism. The relief that follows a dental appointment and the dread that precedes it are two tensed emotions. There are many more. And thus we accept that the defender of the Btheory may need to provide an explanation for the existence of other tensed emotions as well as relief and dread. It should be noted though that the onus of explanation for some of these emotions falls on those who oppose the B-theory.
Clearly the B-theorist does need an explanation of her feeling of relief at the cessation of a dental appointment. But an A-theorist for whom the past has ceased to exist (ie, a presentist) needs to explain his anger at a childhood bully whose taunts have long since ceased. If the B-theorist is apparently irrational to feel relief about the cessation of a pain that is as real as it was when it was being felt, then the presentist is apparently irrational still to be angry about a bully's taunts which, by his lights, no longer exist. 1 A full investigation of such cases is properly the subject of a much larger work. This is especially so given the variety of theories of time which oppose the B-theory. Different explanations of the tensed emotions will be needed from those who think that only the present exists, 2 from those who think 12! that only the past and the present exist, 3 and from those who think that past, present and future exist, but each has a different ontological status. 4 However, our chief concern here is to defend the B-theory's ability to respond to Prior's challenge, although we do think that the solutions we propose have wider applicability.
We do though, propose to address a second type of potential problem for the Btheorist that, to our knowledge, has so far received scant attention. I dread my visit to the dentist, which may well include a painful procedure lasting many minutes.
But I do not at the same time, and to the same degree, dread dying. The latter experience may well be more painful. It is apparently inevitable and if I believed it to be imminent, I would doubtless consider it more frightening. The difference between these two experiences is believed temporal proximity, which is a property that affects the expression of many of the tensed emotions. Just as my dread increases as my dental experience draws nigh, so does my excitement increase along with my temporal proximity to a long awaited holiday. Again, the B-theorist is seemingly in need of an explanation. If all the events in my future are equally real, why do I not view future events that I expect to be equally pleasurable with equal anticipation? Again, our emotional commitment does not seem to fall neatly into line with our ontological commitments.
Thus, we take the problem of temporal chauvinism to be twofold, covering not merely chauvinism with respect to tense, but also with respect to temporal ! 13 proximity. We think that both these phenomena are plausibly explained by tenseless facts about our temporal perspective coupled with tenseless facts about our evolutionary history.
VI. Time and Evolution
We will argue that our expressions of tensed emotions are adaptations 5 A common charge made against evolutionary hypotheses is that they are inevitably 'just so' stories. Behaviour, of course, doesn't fossilise, nor can we return to the distant past to make the observations that would allow us to falsify such hypotheses. However, even concerning hypotheses that are equally untestable, some are more plausible than others. Thornhill and Thornhill's hypothesis (1992) in other ways. We just don't know, and it seems we can't find out.
But contrast the Thornhills' hypothesis with the claim that predators tend to have worse peripheral vision than prey because it is more calamitous for the latter to be surprised than it is for the former. Of course, this hypothesis also depends upon the facts. There could be some currently unknown factor, which better explains differences in facial structure between carnivores and herbivores.
Nonetheless, it seems very likely that in a large number of environments there would be a strong selection pressure on prey species to maximise peripheral vision.
In short then these two evolutionary hypotheses differ greatly in plausibility.
Indeed, given the limitations on our ability to test evolutionary hypotheses, it is only a high degree of plausibility that saves many evolutionary hypotheses (particularly those concerning behaviour) from being no more than evolutionary 'just so' stories. Obviously none of these emotions is adaptive if directed toward past events precisely because we lack causal influence over those events.
This observation is the evolutionary equivalent of 'there's no point crying over spilt milk'. We care about future pain in a way that we don't care about past pain because we can avoid future pain. If our guiding principle is to minimise the total 16! amount of pain in our lives then the best we can do at any particular time is to minimise future pain. We dread painful experiences, because we are hard-wired to do so, and occasionally this works to our detriment. Dental dread is so strong in some people that they never go to the dentist. Those suffused with dental virtue believe that these people consign themselves to a great deal of pain in the somewhat more distant future. The difference between our emotional response to proximate and distant future pains will be discussed in the next section. For now, suffice it to say that in calling dread an adaptation, we are not suggesting that it is an optimal solution to the problems it addresses.
So the B-theorist can be satisfied that our dread at the prospect of future pain (and not past pain) has a good evolutionary explanation which does not rely upon there being tensed facts. Our failure to dread pains in our past is not caused by a tensed fact, viz, that those pains no longer exist. Rather, it is caused by an, untensed physical fact, viz, that we cannot affect past pains. This can be wholly explained by the fact that the predominant direction of causation is from earlier to later.
But what of emotions that we take to be properly directed at past events 6 : grief, relief, embarrassment and so on. Surely the fact that I cannot alter the past makes it seem odd that I should engage in such past-directed emotions. The answer to this problem is complex.
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We begin by noting that although we do not fear past pain, we do care about it.
Because we see it as unavoidable, our caring does not take the form of tensed emotions associated with avoidance (such as nervousness or fear). Instead, the pastdirected emotions such as relief, bitterness, satisfaction, resignation, nostalgia, regret etc. have a very different flavour to them.
It's interesting to note that, prima facie, almost all these emotions pose problems for the B-theory's opponents rather than for the B-theorist. Take presentism, for example. If the past does not exist, why do we feel bitter, satisfied, resigned, nostalgic or regretful about past events? We do not take this to be an exhaustive list of the past-directed emotions. However we do feel entitled to note that, in choosing relief as posing a problem for the B-theory, Prior has settled on an emotion that is unrepresentative of the past-directed emotions as a group. Thus we could at this stage, give a simple (and we think simplistic) answer to Prior and his followers. We could argue that when we look at the tensed emotions as a whole, the A-theorist appears to have a lot more explaining to do than the B-theorist. Followers of Prior could hardly claim that this response was illegitimate. Nonetheless we think that it would be of little value because we doubt that good explanations of tensed emotions will be essentially ontological. In part this is because, as MacBeath tells us, the object of our tensed emotions is not the past but rather the content of our beliefs 18! about the past. In part it is because there are good evolutionary explanations for our feelings of nostalgia, relief etc.
The explanation of past-directed emotions is not, though, as simple as the explanation for future-directed emotions that we have just discussed. So what would be the selective advantage for an organism that indulges in relief, grief, embarrassment etc? We think there are two plausible hypotheses. One is to say that they are forms of learning. They are part of a system by which we catalogue our experiences so that we know in future which ones to avoid, which ones to court and which ones to treat with appropriate caution.
This seems like a very good story for some types of experience. Embarrassment teaches us not to drink too much in the wrong company. Perhaps despair teaches us that almost anything is better than war. But surely we don't want to say that grief teaches us that we would have been better off not having had any loved ones in the first place. We can partly answer this problem by reiterating the fact that to say that an emotion is an adaptation is not to say that its expression is always advantageous.
For a trait to be an adaptation it need only have been advantageous most of the time over much of our history. Nonetheless grief still seems problematic because of its apparently destructive nature. We speak approvingly of working our way through the grieving process but surely we think that our lives would be better if grief were somewhat less traumatic and debilitating.
!Similarly, it is not obvious exactly what selective advantage we gain from our ability to display relief at the conclusion of unpleasant experiences. Perhaps it teaches us to be stoic in future during painful experiences of limited duration.
Perhaps it reminds us that some experiences to which we had become inured, were in fact unpleasant and so are to be avoided in future. Thus people sometimes say that they hadn't realised how destructive a relationship was until it finally ended.
Both these evolutionary hypotheses are plausible but they do rely on relatively untestable claims about the existence of selection pressures. What if there hasn't been sufficient selection pressure either for stoicism or for the evaluation of unpleasant environments?
Even if relief does not turn out to be an adaptation we think that it can still be explained without having to resort to claims about tensed facts. Both relief and grief may be best explained by noting that not all characteristics of evolved organisms are adaptations. Some are merely evolutionary spandrels 7 -side effects of the evolutionary process.
We think it a plausible hypothesis that grief and relief are not adaptations, but rather, side effects of (1) having emotions which do confer selective advantage and (2) having a highly developed memory, which confers selective advantage because it is a prerequisite to certain types of problem solving. We grieve because we are capable of forming strong social and reproductive bonds. We express relief because 20! we have a highly developed sense of danger. Indeed most of us are built to avoid danger. We don't though avoid past danger. Thus at the time at which a fearful experience is past, from our temporal perspective, we then no longer have to expend great amounts of adrenaline trying to avoid it. It is this contrast which we interpret as relief. So, when we look back at our dental appointment and say -'Thank goodness that's over', we are not thanking goodness for the fact that a fearful experience no longer exists. Rather we are thanking goodness for the fact that we no longer have to deal with the fearful experience in question.
VIII. Tensed emotions and temporal proximity
Why do we care more about proximate future pain than distant future pain? We think there is a straightforward answer to this question. Temporal chauvinism is a form of evolutionary cost cutting.
We care more about proximate future pain than distant future pain for the same reason that herbivores care more about proximate predators than they do about distant ones. Ideally, an antelope on the Serengeti plains wants to avoid being eaten by any lion, not just by lions that are presently nearby. Given this fact, should we expect antelopes to evolve some means of tracking and avoiding the total lion population rather than just avoiding the lions that are presently nearby? After all, ! 21 'Run from local lions' seems like a good strategy, unless it leads you to run into a portion of the plain that is positively lion-infested. So, what would be a better strategy? Clearly, an omniscient antelope would navigate its way round the plains so as to put maximal distance between itself and each and every lion. But of course real antelopes do not do anything so sophisticated for two obvious reasons.
Firstly, tracking distant lions is much more difficult than tracking local ones. It is hard enough to detect a predator in long grass at close range. Detecting lions at a great distance would require the evolution of spectacular sensory equipment along with the neurological machinery that would be needed to make sense of such detailed sensory information. The head, which housed such super-computing abilities and spectacular sensory capacities, would probably be so large as to preclude comfortable movement. Not surprisingly, real antelopes do not possess such capacities.
Secondly, the problem of predicting the behaviour of large numbers of organisms all interacting with one another is computationally 'hard'. Let's assume that you know where all the lions are and you have an appropriate grasp on their psychology. Still, you would require spectacular cognitive abilities to use that knowledge to predict which parts of the plain were likely to be lion-infested at particular points in the future. If this is right, then perhaps the antelope's best bet really is to use a strategy such as 'Avoid local danger'. We think there is a strong 22! analogy between the avoidance of spatially distant danger and the avoidance of temporally distant danger.
I don't now worry about having a car accident when I'm sixty-five because nothing I can do now will reliably guard against such an outcome. Perhaps I could vow that I will never again travel in cars once I turn sixty-five, but I have no guarantee that future events will not cause me to renege on that promise. And the further ahead I attempt to predict such possible future events the more am I thwarted by combinatorial explosion in possible futures. As with the spatial case, the costs of predicting temporally distant events outweigh the benefits.
Of course, in positing that we are somehow built to worry more about the near future than the distant future, we are not suggesting that such behaviours are totally determined by our inherited characteristics. Activities such as bungy-jumping would be simply impossible if we were not able to ignore clear physiological warnings about the danger of imminent plummeting. By the same token, it obviously is possible for us to engage in strategies designed to minimise distant future pain. What we are claiming is that our psychologies make it harder for us to be blasé about the present or worried about the distant future. When we succeed at putting that bit aside for a far distant rainy day it seems we do so despite the lure of more pressing proximate pains and pleasures. These responses to the questions that we have addressed do not require an Atheory conception of time and events. They claim merely that we experience the world from a given temporal perspective, and our temporal relation and temporal proximity to certain events affects the way we feel about them.
To return to Cockburn's argument, he thinks that being 'past', 'present', or 'future' cannot confer special status on an event if no event is really 'past', really 'present' or really 'future'. An event has special status if it warrants an 'appropriate' emotional response from a person. So, unless the tenses are real properties of events, they cannot warrant the sorts of emotional response that we actually do have towards them. We think this is wrong, and our examination of Cockburn's spatial analogy illustrates why. According to Cockburn, the fact that a person is suffering 'here' does not confer any special status on the suffering considered in itself. We disagree. There is a difference between how I feel about spatially local and spatially distant suffering. I feel more acute concern about suffering that is occurring in my spatial vicinity than I do about suffering that occurs at a great distance from me. The 26! reason for this is that I can do more about spatially local suffering than I can about spatially distant suffering. In the spatial case, relational properties can perform the role of conferring special status on events by warranting specific emotional responses, and by giving us reasons to act in particular ways. The same is true, we submit, in the temporal case. The fact that a pain is simultaneous with my judgement about it gives me a reason to feel concern and take evasive action then.
Similarly, the relational properties 'earlier than' and 'later than' can give one reason to feel different emotions about a given event or state of affairs. If pain is earlier than one's belief about it one will feel a different emotion than if pain is later than one's belief about it. Once again, the reason for this is that I can do something about the latter, but I can do nothing about the former.
Cockburn's conclusion is a non sequitur. He moves from the B-theory's claim that all events are equally real to the conclusion that all events are equally significant and deserving of equal emotional response. But there are no grounds to support this inference. Cockburn gives no consideration to the possibility that relational properties such as 'being in the same vicinity as' and 'being at the same time as' might confer 'special status' on an event or state of affairs. If such relational properties can warrant particular emotional responses, or can give us reasons to act in certain ways, then the B-theory is exonerated. In other words, Cockburn has not ruled out a B-theory explanation for the diversity of our emotional responses to !events in the past, present and future, where being in the past, present and future is a feature of our temporal perspective on those events, and not an intrinsic feature of the events themselves. We submit that relational properties can indeed confer 'special status' on events in the way Cockburn requires. Furthermore, we can provide a causal explanation for this phenomenon, as can be seen by our responses to the above questions.
In conclusion then, temporal relational properties can confer special status on an event. According to the B-theory of time, while time itself is tenseless, our experience of it is tensed. We can only experience one moment at a time, so our experience of the world is necessarily from a given temporal perspective. With this feature of our experience of the world as a given, there are plausible explanations, appealing to evolutionary considerations, as to why our emotional lives have the pattern that they do. None of these explanations require that time be as the A-theory says it is.
Of course, the evolutionary hypotheses we have put forward are in the end empirical and we cannot hope by argument alone to prove that they explain human temporal chauvinism. What we do claim is that the hypotheses we put forward are very plausible and that that plausibility removes from the B-theorist the onus of explanation placed upon her by Prior, Cockburn and many others.
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